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Abstract  
In this paper are presented essential themes in the subject of personnel economics. In the first 
part analysis has been conducted on the impact of peer pressure on workplace behaviour. Then 
again models for compensation structures within firms, and their influence on the utility of work 
by employees. In the final section of the paper the productivity spillover effect has been 
analyzed, and the causes of existence of spillovers and their impact on workers’ productivity.  
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1. Analysis of the impact of peer pressures on workplace behaviour 
Compensation scheme can be represented:  W is guaranteed 
wage b is a piece rate based on the number of units of output e and K is a constant term to 
satisfy the individual rationality. Situation is presented in Fig.42 Low ability workers have steep 
indifference curves additional effort must be compensated by a large increase in income, flatter 
indifference curves are those for higher ability workers hourly wage function starts at zero 
becomes vertical at e0 and then horizontal at point A. If the workers are offered an hourly wage 
schedule everyone chooses point A since there is lower utility working at higher levels of effort. 
High ability workers chose to move from A to B (the tangent point of the budget line and the 
indifference curve) when piece rate schedule is introduced. Switch in compensation scheme leads 
to increase in average ability and productivity of workforce and has sorting effect of recruitment 
of high quality workers, and variance of worker ability to output increases. In table 2 dependent 
variable is log of (Output per worker per day) there are 29837 observations. Overall productivity 
increased about 44% (an increase in the log of 0.368) as a result from switch from the hourly 
wage contract to a piece rate and the equation for interpretation is  exp of 
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0.368 is 1, 44 and that – 1 is 0.44*100=44%.Second parameter is an increase of output for a 
given worker   after the switch to a piece rates occurred. This is a log increase of   0.197 or 
interpretation as previous coefficient with antilog as 22% increase in productivity for average 
worker. The coefficient before the dummy for workers hired after the piece rate has been 
implemented is significant; with size 0.243 log showing how higher their productivity is 
compared with the workers working in hourly wage scheme. The results from Table 5 show that 
workers who are or have potential to be in a piece rate range   experienced an average increase in 
output of 0.55 units. Those who never reached piece rate range experienced an increase in 
output of 0.32 units. The output of these workers increased conditional on the high ability 
workers decision, otherwise we define as peer pressure effect. 
2. Analysis of Lazear and Shaw (2007)  model for compensation structures within 
firms 
In fig.13 is compared Paying for input versus paying for output. Without measuring the 
individual output (q) firm pays wage1 which is the mean of output across the all workers, after 
incurring fixed measurement costs, the firm pays all the individuals the distribution of wages 
labelled wage, if the firm does not bear this measurement costs, the best workers in area A will 
leave the firm for other firms that do measure their output. Also important are the questions 
how should firms avoid losing “star” workers what is their structure pay for optimal retention of 
workers. Assume that the workers have output q that varies across the workers in a typical bell 
shaped curve distribution. Each individual’s output is unknown to the firm, because output is 
costly to measure, output however can be measured at some cost. The firm can forego the 
measurement, in which case no measurement cost is incurred and no information about workers 
ability is revealed. So, firm pays a straight salary, which must equal the average output. The firm 
also can measure the output of its employees and pay workers according to their individual 
output, which can be called “pay for performance”. The distribution of pay matches the 
distribution of output minus the measurement costs. First implication of the model is that firm 
will pay for performance when it is cheaper to measure performance, good workers will want 
their output to be measured. In figure 1workers that are in part A will leave the firm if the firm 
pays an average wage rather than using pay for performance. The cost of measuring output is 
decreasing over time due to decreasing technologies. Second implication of this model is when a 
worker has an alternative high paying jobs, it is important for the firm to pay the worker for what 
they produce or the firm will lose worker. Third implication is as the lower the tail of distribution 
of worker quality gets larger, performance pay is more likely to be optimal. Also paying for 
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performance induces people to work harder. Workers with high disutility of effort relative to 
their output will avoid firms that pay for performance. Performance pay is used to induce 
selection by workers into the right jobs. Also pay for individuals should have less variance than 
the output. Pay compression is a part of optimal contracts; finally pay compression can be used 
to insure workers against uncertain outcomes.  
 
3. What “positive productivity spillover “? Assess the evidence concerning the 
existence and size of such spillovers provided by Mas and Moretti . 
 
The   introduction of a high productivity worker can increase productivity of incumbent workers 
as a result of peer effects and it could worsen sometimes because of the free riding effect. This is 
positive productivity spillover. The spillover is large for workers with above average productivity 
and small for workers below average productivity Individual specific spillover is a monotonic 
decreasing function of a worker skill level. The aim is to investigate how workers in a team will 
react exogenous change in the productivity what is workers utility working in teams 
  where the last part of the equation is a 
peer pressure. In the baseline model workers productivity at a given moment of time varies as a 
function of average permanent productivity we marked permanent co-worker productivity as  
this permanent co-worker’s productivities are estimated holding constant co-workers 
composition and therefore do not reflect spillovers. Second regressed are the  10 minute changes 
in individual productivity on changes in       
is the number of active workers in each 10 minute interval at the relevant store, and  is a set 
of dummies for each day of the week  * 10 minute period *store combination .The dependent 
variable is change in log productivity of worker i. The term  is the change in average 
permanent productivity of i’s worker from t-1 to t. In table 6 4  the first column shows that 10 % 
increase in co-workers productivity is associated with 1.8% increase in reference worker 
productivity. This finding indicates that positive spillovers appear to dominate any free riding 
effect. Entry of a worker with above average permanent productivity is associated with a 1.1% 
increase in productivity of co-worker. The exit of an above average co-worker leads to a 0.5% 
decline in a productivity relative to the exit of below average co-worker. When a high 
productivity worker starts a shift, the productivity of other workers rises of about 0.6%, when a 
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high productivity worker ends shift the productivity of other workers falls by 0.6%. Column 6 in 
table 2 shows that most of the spillover effects benefits the productivity of low productivity 
workers, but high productivity workers are not reducing their productivity in presence of low 
productivity workers. This finding is important because of its implications for optimal mixing of 
workers     
 
4. Three possible causes of such spillovers in the organisations, according of Mas and 
Moretti, and the main implications of their paper for hiring wage setting and workforce 
organisation. 
 
Three possible causes of existence of spillovers are: Social pressure (worker experiences 
disutility when working lees hard than other workers on shift, but only if co-workers notice), 
contagious enthusiasm (worker experiences disutility if it is not working hard relative to other 
workers on a shift, even if no one know that she is working slowly), knowledge spillovers 
(occur as information is transmitted from one worker to next)5. Column 1 of table 66 show that 
just about the entire peer effect is operating through   changes in workers that are able to 
monitor as more productive workers are introduced into a shift, only the co-workers that are in 
their direct line of vision seem to be more productive, the column 2 model does include dummy 
for worker in front and worker behind this results from the first two models are consistent with 
the social pressure. Consistent with social pressure is the addition of worker behind an 
incumbent worker regardless of her productivity results in an increased productivity of an 
incumbent worker of 4% economically and statistically significant, the addition of a worker in 
front on the other front decreases productivity of the incumbent worker by approximately 3%, 
the finding suggests that there still is a scope for free-riding. In next column 3 and 4 does 
physical distance maters is being tested. The social pressure applied by co-worker who are 
located behind and are closer appear to have a larger effect than the measure applied by co-
workers who are behind and are farther. The corresponding coefficient for co-workers who are 
one or two registers behind the reference worker is 0.16 .The corresponding coefficient for co-
workers that are three or four registers behind the reference worker is 0.1.The change in 
presence of a co-worker one or two positions behind increases  productivity by 2.5% .A change 
in the presence of co-worker three or four positions behind increases productivity by only 
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0.7%.Table 77 on the other hand there are shown estimates of the equation 
,The point estimate   
 is virtually zero, meaning that the changes in the permanent productivity of co-workers who 
have had little previous overlap with ,have no effect on the change of  productivity form t-1 
to t.   Denotes low schedule overlap M, denotes medium schedule overlap. And overlap means 
interactions. And   changes in the permanent productivity of co-workers with medium and high 
previous overlap have positive and statistically significant relationship with changes in i’s 
contemporaneous productivity. The entire spillover effect comes from changes in the 
composition of workers for whom i is the light of sight. The important finding in table 6 was 
that there is a relationship between changes in the permanent productivity of i’s workers and 
contemporaneous productivity depending on the spatial orientation of the co-workers in relation 
with i. In column 3 table 7, we test whether changes in the presence of co-workers, irrespective 
of their permanent productivity affects i's productivity depending on whether these co-workers 
have high, medium or low previous overlap with i ,as well as the spatial orientation of these co-
workers in relation to i. It has been found that changes in the presence of a co-worker in front of 
i has either no effect ,or negative effect on i's productivity.  Workers with low schedule overlap 
with i, their entry is not associated   with a statistically significant change in i’s productivity. As 
conclusions from these findings it is important that mix of high and low productivity workers is 
optimal. 
5.Summary  
Switch in compensation scheme (from guaranteed fixed wage to piece rate) leads to increase in 
average ability and productivity of workforce and has sorting effect of recruitment of high quality 
workers, and variance of worker ability to output increases. Workers with high disutility of effort 
relative to their output will avoid firms that pay for performance. Performance pay is used to 
induce selection by workers into the right jobs. Also pay for individuals should have less variance 
than the output. Pay compression is a part of optimal contracts; finally pay compression can be 
used to insure workers against uncertain outcomes. The   introduction of a high productivity 
worker can increase productivity of incumbent workers as a result of peer effects and it could 
worsen sometimes because of the free riding effect. Most of the spillover effects benefits the 
productivity of low productivity workers, but high productivity workers are not reducing their 
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productivity in presence of low productivity workers. Three possible causes of existence of 
spillovers are: Social pressure, contagious enthusiasm, knowledge spillovers. 
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Paying for input versus paying for output  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Output, wage                                                                 wage1=mean (q) 
A 
Wage2=q-(measurement cost) 
q=output  
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Appendix 2  
 
Table (2) The effect of changes of average co-worker permanent productivity on reference person current 
productivity 
 (1)              (2)               (3)                 (4)                (5)                 (6) 
∆ Co-worker permanent                0.176           0.159                                                 0.160              0.261 
Productivity                                  (0.023)        (0.023)                                              (0.026)           (0.033) 
∆ Co-worker permanent                                                                                 -0.010 
 Productivity yt+1                                                                                            (0.026) 
∆ Co-worker  permanent prod.                                                                                                         -0.214 
*Above average worker                                                                                                                   (0.046) 
Entry of above average                                           0.011 
Productivity worker                                               (0.001)                                           
Exit of an above average                                        -0.005 
Productivity worker                                                (0.001) 
Shift entry of above average                                                      0.006 
Productivity worker                                                                  (0.002) 
Shift exit of an above average                                                   -0.006 
Productivity worker                                                                  (0.002) 
Observations                   1,734.140        1,734.140   1,734.164   1,734.164          1,356.643        1,734.140     
Controls                            No                  Yes               Yes            Yes                    Yes                  Yes   
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Table 6 The effect of changes of average co-worker permanent productivity on reference person 
current productivity ;Models by spatial orientation and proximity  
 
(1)                 (2)              (3)            (4)                 (5)  
∆Co-worker permanent                              0.233 
Productivity behind                                   (0.019) 
∆Co-worker permanent                              0.007 
Productivity in front                                 (0.018) 
∆Co-worker permanent                                                                            0.162 
productivity  behind and closer                                                                (0.016) 
∆Co-worker permanent                                                                            0.016 
Productivity in front and closer                                                                (0.015) 
∆Co-worker permanent                                                                            0.100 
Productivity behind and farther                                                                (0.018) 
∆Co-worker permanent productivity                                                         0.003 
In front and farther                                                                                  (0.018) 
∆Worker behind                                                                    0.040                                                 0.040               
                                                                                              (0.003)                                              (0.003) 
∆Worker in front                                                                  -0.033                                                 -0.033 
                                                                                               (0.003)                                        (0.003) 
∆Worker behind and closer                                   0.025 
  (0.002)   
∆Worker in front and closer -0.042 
                                                                                                                                        (0.002)   
∆Worker behind and farther     0.007 
    (0.002)      
∆Worker in front and farther                                                                                           0.0001 
                                                                                                                      (0.002) 
∆Worker behind*                                                                                                                            0.159 
Average FE                                                                                                                                       (0.039) 
∆Worker in front*                                                                                                                             -0.045 
Average FE                                                                                                                                       (0.037) 
Observations                                      1,660,312        1,734,164        1,501,555           1,734,164       1,734,164 
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Table 7 Mas&Moretti Peers at work (2006) 
Table 7:The Effect of changes of average co-worker permanent productivity on reference person 
current productivity ;Models by previous exposure to co-workers and spatial orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)                                                         (2)                                                                  (3) 
∆Co-worker permanent         0.013        (I)∆Co-worker permanent            0.018    (I)Low exposure worker               0.001 
 Prod: low exposure              (0.012)         prod. behind low exposure        (0.056)       Behind                                   (0.002) 
(II)∆ Co-worker permanent   0.084         (II)∆Co-worker permanent          0.116   (II)∆Medium high exposure worker 0.020 
Prod:medium exposure         (0.014)       prod: behind &medium exposure (0.023)     Behind                                      (0.001)  
 (III)∆Co-worker permanent  0.075          (III) ∆Co-worker permanent        0.122  (III)∆High exposure worker           0.016 
Prod:high exposure                (0.017)            prod: behind & high exposure(0.0250         Behind                                  (0.002) 
                                                                            (IV)∆Co-worker permanent             0.002  (IV)∆Low exposure worker             0.003 
                                                                    Prod: in front& low exposure        (0.025)        in front                                        (0.002) 
                                                                            (V)∆Co-worker permanent             -0.007    (V) ∆Medium exposure worker      0.001 
                                                                      Prod: in front& medium exposure  (0.006)           In front                                 (0.001) 
                                                                      (VI)∆Co-worker permanent             0.000     (VI)∆High exposure worker  -0.010 
                                                                       Prod: in front& high exposure         (0.005)         in front                               (0.002) 
p-value  H0:(I)=(II)                 0.000              p-value   H0:(I)=(II)                              0.105      p-value  H0:(I)=(II)            0.000         
               H0:(I)=(III)               0.003                             H0:(I)=(III)                             0.090                     H 0:(I)=(III)         0.000    
               H0:(II)=(III)              0.655                              H0:(II)=(III)                           0.852                    H0:(II)=(III)           0.063 
                                                                                        H0(IV)=(V)                            0.562                    H0:(IV)=(V)          0.203 
                                                                                        H0:(IV)=(VI)                          0.891                    H0: (IV)=(VI)        0.000   
                                                                                        H0:(V)=(VI)                           0.328                     H0:(V)=(VI)          0.000 
 
 
Observations                         1,659,450                                                                   1,659,450                                        1,659,450    
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Table Contagious enthusiasm, Social pressure, Knowledge spillover 
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